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Contexts as Shared Commitments
Manuel García-Carpintero*
LOGOS-Departament de Lògica, Història i Filosofia de la Ciència, Universitat de Barcelona, Barcelona, Spain
Contemporary semantics assumes two influential notions of context: one coming
from Kaplan (1989), on which contexts are sets of predetermined parameters, and
another originating in Stalnaker (1978), on which contexts are sets of propositions
that are “common ground.” The latter is deservedly more popular, given its flexibility in
accounting for context-dependent aspects of language beyondmanifest indexicals, such
as epistemic modals, predicates of taste, and so on and so forth; in fact, properly dealing
with demonstratives (perhaps ultimately all indexicals) requires that further flexibility. Even
if we acknowledge Lewis (1980)’s point that, in a sense, Kaplanian contexts already
include common ground contexts, it is better to be clear and explicit about what contexts
constitutively are. Now, Stalnaker (1978, 2002, 2014) defines context-as-common-
ground as a set of propositions, but recent work shows that this is not an accurate
conception. The paper explains why, and provides an alternative. The main reason is
that several phenomena (presuppositional treatments of pejoratives and predicates of
taste, forces other than assertion) require that the common ground includes non-doxastic
attitudes such as appraisals, emotions, etc. Hence the common ground should not
be taken to include merely contents (propositions), but those together with attitudes
concerning them: shared commitments, as I will defend.
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TWO NOTIONS OF CONTEXT
As Stalnaker (2014, pp.13–34) reminds us, in formal semantics/pragmatics there have been two
prominent theoretical articulations of the intuitive notion of a context—a concrete situation relative
to which linguistic exchanges take place. The first is the one described in Kaplan’s (1989) work,
by means of which Kaplan’s important notion of character (the linguistic meaning of context-
dependent expressions) is defined. On this view, a context is a sequence of items on which the
content of a sentence (“what is said” with it) might depend, given the character of some of the
expressions in it. Thus, a context includes a speaker, the value of the character of “I”; a time, the
value of the character of “now”; a place, the value of the character of “here”; a possible world,
the value of the character of “actual.” In contemporary intensional semantics, this is modeled as
a centered possible world—a possible world together with a designated time and subject.
The second is the notion characterized in Stalnaker’s (1978) influential work on presupposition
and assertion: “a body of information that is available, or presumed to be available, as a resource for
communication” (Stalnaker, 2014, p. 24). This is modeled as the “context set”—the set of possible
worlds compatible with the presumed common knowledge of the participants1. This second notion
is supposed to encompass the previous one, because the information needed to interpret indexicals
1For purposes of the present contrast, I take Lewis’ (1979) model as a variant of the Stalnakerian model. I mention some
relevant differences below.
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(who the speaker is, what the time is, the place and the world
in which the exchange takes place) is included in the context
set. This raises delicate issues, not unrelated to the ones that I
will be discussing, concerning how the “propositions” that make
up contexts-as-common-ground should be understood for this
claim to be justified; but it seems intuitively acceptable as a
starting point2.
At first sight, the second conception is considerably more
flexible than the first one, and as a result more adequate as
a theoretical tool. In addition to “pure indexicals” like those
already mentioned, there are demonstratives such as “he,” “you,”
“that”; and their contribution to content appears to depend
not on “objective” features of the concrete situation, but on
what the participants take for granted (about who is the
salient/demonstrated male or female, etc.) when they are uttered.
To some researchers, including the present author, “answering
machines” and related examples suggest that the divide between
pure indexicals and demonstratives is spurious (cf. Cohen and
Michaelson, 2013 and references there, although the authors
do not subscribe to those views). And most linguists also
contend that the distinction between deictic uses of indexicals,
whose reference is determined by means of demonstrations,
and anaphoric uses, determined rather by means of their
links to the previous discourse, does not draw a genuine
semantic boundary. As Heim and Kratzer (1998, p. 240) put
it, “anaphoric and deictic uses seem to be special cases of the
same phenomenon: the pronoun refers to an individual which,
for whatever reason, is highly salient at the moment when the
pronoun is processed.” To the extent that we are clear as to
how the information that o is the speaker comes to be in the
context-as-common-ground so that utterances of “I” can be
interpreted, it does not seem more problematic to understand
how the information that o is the demonstrated male comes to
be there.
Lewis (1980, pp. 85–86) points out, however, that the
Kaplanian notion of context can also be sensibly taken to
encompass the Stalnakerian one, and the previous points with it:
That is not to say that the only features of context are time, place,
and world. There are countless other features, but they do not
vary independently. They are given by the intrinsic and relational
character of the time, place, and world in question. The speaker of
the context is the one who is speaking at that time, at that place,
at that world . . . The audience, the standards of precision, the
salience relations, the presuppositions... of the context are given
less directly. They are determined, so far as they are determined
at all, by such things as the previous course of the conversation
2Huvenes and Stokke (2015) question “information-centrism,” the view that
context-as-body-of-information is what is needed in semantic theories of context-
dependent expressions. This is also the view I am arguing against, although I
will follow a different route. They use confusion cases involving indexicals and
demonstratives, arguing that something beyond bodies of information is needed
for proper theorizing about them. I think a more structured view of contexts along
the lines to be suggested below might handle their cases, and hence that their
arguments are interestingly complementary to those given here.More specifically, I
think a proper handling of their cases requires adding further structure to contexts,
distinguishing presuppositions that are semantic requirements (Fine, 2007) from
those that are just shared knowledge with different sources—cp. Huvenes and
Stokke (2015), fn. 12 and surrounding text.
that is still going on at the context, the states of mind of the
participants, and the conspicuous aspects of their surroundings.
Thus, the two notions of context might be perfectly compatible,
“complementary, rather than alternative theories of the same
thing” (Stalnaker, 2014, p. 16). For present purposes, however, I’ll
assume the Stalnakerian one; even if Lewis is right, it has at least
the advantage of allowing for a more perspicuous presentation of
the relevant features on which our theoretical proposals rely3.
As we have seen, the Stalnakerian notion is characterized as
a set of propositions, or contents. The point I want to make in
this article is that we should think of them as having instead
a richer structure—more specifically, as having illocutionary
features, understood in non-psychological, normative terms4.
I will argue that it should not be understood as a set
of propositions (or other representational contents) that are
(presumed to be) mutually known, or mutually believed, but,
more generally, as a class of shared propositional commitments—
some in the belief-mode, but some in other illocutionary modes
too5.
The argument in the following pages proceeds by laying
down five illustrative examples, observing that each of them
constitutes a particular instance of the main claim just stated.
They are: the contribution to the determination of what is said of
a “question under assumption”; the interpretation of directives;
the interpretation of pejoratives and slurs; the semantic of
predicates of taste; the interpretation of fictions. Before going
into the discussion of the examples, however, I need to say
something about meaning and norms—both discourse norms,
such as conversational norms and rules of accommodation, and
illocutionary norms.
I should admit at the outset that the point I want to
make should not be controversial, and in fact it is in a
way obvious to researchers in this field. It is enough to pay
attention to the fact that questions and commands make
contributions of their own to the context in order to realize
this. It is sometimes noted, and just put aside for reasons
of expediency, because the semantics of declaratives is more
familiar and well-studied. However, I will show that not
having it clearly in mind leads to faulty arguments and
overlooked possibilities. Section Example 3: Pejoratives and
Slurs below on pejoratives is thus the core of the paper. In
defending his truth-conditional account of pejoratives that I
will question there, Hom (2012) approvingly quotes MacFarlane
(2011):
3There are other notions of context in the literature, which might be free from
the problems I’ll raise; cf., for instance, Capone (2013), Fetzer (2012), and
Gross (2001). I take it, however, that the Kaplan-Stalnaker’s stance is sufficiently
influential to merit discussion.
4This would not come as a surprise to those who contend that propositions
themselves are constitutively endowed with force-like traits (King et al., 2014;
Hanks, 2015); but the considerations here will not presuppose such a highly
controversial view (wrong, I think), and will be compatible with more traditional
views on which propositional contents themselves lack force-like features and can
be put forward in different illocutionary modes.
5Green’s (2000, p. 468) notion of the conversational record, defined in terms of the
illocutionary commitments of discourse participants, offers a good formal model
for the sort of structure I’ll be arguing for.
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The beauty of truth-conditional semantics is that it provides a
common currency that can be used to explain indefinitely many
interaction effects in a simple and economical account.We should
be prepared to accept a messy, non-truth-conditional account
. . . only if there is no truth-conditional account that explains the
data.
The uncontroversial point that my two initial examples make
shows this rhetoric to be highly problematic; in addition,
these two initial examples will show how general the point
is, in fact affecting all ordinary discourses. The three final
examples show that we ignore it at our peril, starting
with the very case for which Hom invokes the rhetoric
of the methodological priority of the familiar semantics for
declaratives.
MEANING AND NORMS
In the previous section, I contrasted two different ways of
thinking of contexts, and favored the Stalnakerian one. In this
section I will discuss another contrast, between normative and
descriptive, non-normative views of meaning, and I will indicate
why I favor the former.
In recent work already mentioned, Stalnaker (2014, pp. 36–
37) contrasts two more different ways of thinking of contexts,
which, as he points out, reflect the contrasting ways in which
Austin and Grice thought of speech acts. Austin (1962) suggests
thinking of them as social practices constituted by social norms,
usually established and maintained by conventions; Grice (1957)
takes them instead to be definable in natural, psychological terms,
appealing to a peculiar kind of reflexive intention. Stalnaker’s own
views favor the latter sort of account; Lewis (1979) offers a model
well adapted to the former. With respect to this issue, I depart
from Stalnaker’s views and favor the ones he rejects.
What is at stake in such debates? For present purposes,
I’ll just mention two relevant concerns that Austinians have
with the Gricean account, which I take very seriously. On the
negative side, Austinians emphasize that speech acts might well
take place even when their authors lack the complex intentions
that Griceans posit (Alston, 2000, pp. 48–49). A clerk in an
information booth makes an assertion when she utters “the
plane will arrive on time,” even though she does not care at
all what psychological impact this has on her audience. On
the positive side, Austinians emphasize that speech acts are
governed by norms, not just “regulative” ones (be clear!, polite!,
witty!) but constitutive ones, and that this has a stronger impact
on the determination of the speech act made than whatever
communicative intentions the author had. Thus, for instance, the
clerk in the above example might be criticized if she cannot have
known the information she provided—we had been reliably told
that the plane had only just taken off from the departing airport,
and so we reply, “you cannot know that!.”
Williamson (1996/2000) has defended an account of assertion
along Austinian lines, on which the following norm (the
knowledge rule) is constitutive of the act, and individuates it:
(KR) One must [(assert p) only if one knows p].
Other writers have accepted Williamson’s view that assertion is
defined by constitutive rules such as KR, but have proposed
alternative norms; thus, Weiner (2005) proposes a truth rule, TR,
and Lackey (2007) a reasonableness rule, RBR:
(TR) One must [(assert p) only if p].
(RBR) One must [(assert p) only if it is reasonable for one to
believe p].
Norms like these are sui generis: they do not have their sources in
moral or prudential codes, but in specifically illocutionary ones.
They are defeasible and pro tanto: they can be overridden by
stronger norms.
And it is possible to violate them, thereby rendering the
acts wrong but occurring: what is constitutive of asserting p is
not that one knows p, but that in performing it one is thereby
subject to the requirement that one knows p. There are plenty of
situations in which p is asserted when p is false, or the speaker
lacks justification for it. The assertion is then wrong, and wrong
relative to norms defining the nature of such a speech act.
Stalnaker (1978) provides an account of assertion, and of what
I take to be an ancillary speech act, presupposition, in a Gricean
spirit, on which a presupposition is a requirement on the context,
and an assertion is a proposal to change it by adding to it its
content, which will take effect if the assertion is not rejected. He
(ibid., 87) puts forward several reasons why his suggestion cannot
be taken as a definition sensu stricto: it is not individuative, in
that acts other than assertion are such proposals, and presumably
would be circular if taken in that way because it helps itself
to the notion of another speech act, rejection. He nonetheless
shows the account to be able to provide explanations for different
phenomena.
One of those is presupposition accommodation, as when we
decline an invitation by uttering “I cannot come, I have to pick
up my wife at the airport.” This will not be felt to be in any way
incorrect even in contexts in which it is not mutually known,
previous to the utterance, that the speaker is married. Stalnaker’s
suggestion to account for this relies on the correct point that
whether or not the presuppositions of an utterance are satisfied
should be checked right after the utterance has been produced.
This is so because in many cases it is the very occurrence of
the utterance that makes it the case that the context includes
the information that must be in it for some presuppositions to
be correct. Thus, an utterance u of “I am hungry” asserts that
x is hungry, for some assignment to x, and presupposes that x
is the speaker of u; but this latter information comes to be in
place concurrently with the utterance. Something similar obtains,
according to Stalnaker, in the “my wife” case.
Now, in previous work (García-Carpintero, 2015) I have
argued that, although this is correct as far as it goes—so that in
standard cases of informative presuppositions they have become
common knowledge at “presupposition evaluation time,” so that
the common knowledge norm for presuppositions is ultimately
not violated—in order to sustain it two assumptions that
Stalnaker rejects are needed:6 first, that some presuppositions
(such as those assumed here for “I” and “the”) are lexically
6Cf. von Fintel (2008).
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triggered, and an adequate semantics for natural languages
should countenance them. Second, that we think of presupposing
as an ancillary speech act, understood along normative-Austinian
lines—its constitutive norm being that the presupposed content
is commonly known.
If those points are right, the model that Lewis (1979) provides
for presupposing, asserting, and their interrelated effect on
contexts such as accommodation is more appropriate than the
psychological one that Stalnaker assumes. As is usual when it
comes to understanding normative notions, Lewis takes games
as a model, and offers different rules of accommodation for
different expressions, understood in normative terms. Thismodel
can also be helpfully used in order to properly understand
indirect speech acts. Grice (1975) offered a deservedly influential
analysis for a very specific case, conversational implicatures, in
which assertions are indirectly conveyed by other assertions. The
specificmaxims that Grice provided were attuned to that case and
cannot be generalized. For instance, the maxim of quality (“Try
to make your contribution one that is true”) cannot be applied
to explain how assertions are indirectly conveyed by questions,
because questions are not constitutively either true or false. The
Cooperative Principle (“make your conversational contribution
such as is required, at the stage at which it occurs, by the accepted
purpose or direction of the talk exchange”), from which Grice
derives the specific maxims, is a regulative norm that would be
involved in any general account of indirect speech acts.
In sum, the view that I will assume henceforth as a point of
departure, which my arguments suggest we should improve, has
it that contexts are Stalnakerian sets of propositions as opposed
to Kaplanian sets of parameters, and that their dynamics is to
be understood along Lewisian normative lines, as opposed to
Stalnakerian intentional ones.
EXAMPLE 1: UNDERDETERMINACY AND
THE QUESTION UNDER DISCUSSION
I will now start developing my argument. In the next two sections
I will focus on two cases for which there is widespread agreement
that the propositional account of context is inadequate—
questions and directives, the former in this and the latter in
the next. I will argue that, even though the point that questions
need be treated as adding to contexts more than propositions
is sufficiently well established already, it has more pervasive
consequences than usually acknowledged or even realized.
Some writers (e.g., Alston, 2000, pp. 116–120; Jary, 2010, pp.
15–16; Pagin, 2011, p. 123) defend accounts of assertion that
imply that this act cannot be indirectly made, by requiring that
an assertion consists of the communication of the proposition p
by means of a sentence that means p. I think that this incorrectly
makes it impossible by definition to make assertions of p with
sentences that mean something else (or even by fully non-
linguistic means): in rhetorically asking “Who the heck wants
to read this book?,” I think I am asserting that (to put it mildly)
nobody wants to read it. Aside from direct counterexamples like
this, we might ask: why would assertion be special, in being the
only speech act that cannot be made indirectly? Unless the point
generalizes, and no speech act can be made indirectly; but it
seems clear that, say, a literal expression of thanks such as “thanks
for not browsing our journals” in a newsstand indirectly conveys
a request.
Recently, however, other writers have provided arguments
that would answer this worry, and hence would support views
of assertion along the lines indicated. While Camp (2006) and
Lepore and Stone (2010) have discussed the argument for specific
cases such as metaphorical assertions, Fricker (2012) advances
more general considerations. A point on which these authors
rely is that indirectly conveyed claims are too ambiguous or
underdetermined in their contents for the speaker to fully
commit to them in the way constitutive of assertions7.
Notoriously, similar points have been made by so-called
“minimalists” about semantic content such as Cappelen and
Lepore (2005) and Borg (2012) against so-called “moderate
contextualists” such as Bach (1994). Minimalists defend that
semantic contents are truth-conditional (i.e., given a specification
of a possible world, they deliver a truth-value), but nonetheless
context-invariantly determined except when it comes to the
value of “pure indexicals” (those for which Kaplanian contexts
reserve parameters, “I,” “now,” “today,” and a few more).
On the basis of much-debated examples such as “I am
ready,” “I am tall,” “I have had breakfast,” or “there is
milk in the fridge,” moderate contextualists plausibly contend
that compositionally determined semantic contents are truth-
conditionally incomplete: they do not yield a truth-value given
a possible world. However, context might help to complete them,
fixing a fully determinate content that the utterance literally and
directly conveys. Against this, minimalists produce slippery slope
arguments (Cappelen and Lepore, 2005, pp. 43–44; Borg, 2012, p.
83), allegedly showing that moderate contextualism is an unstable
standpoint, ultimately committing their proponents to the much
more radical view put forward, say, by Travis (1985), which
does away with any recognizable notion of semantic content.
These arguments purport to show that moderate contextualists’
strategies would leave literal, directly expressed truth-conditional
contents wildly underdertermined.
Thus, if these combined appeals to considerations of semantic
underdetermination were valid, we would end up with the
absurd consequence that the only contents we can ever assert
are trivially true claims such as (on Borg’s view, in the case
of “I am ready”) that I am ready for something or other or
their trivially false negations. Fortunately, there is a compelling
reply, which Schoubye and Stokke (2015) develop in detail for
the case of minimalists’ criticisms of moderate contextualism.
They appeal to Roberts’s (2012) proposal, elaborating on previous
work by Carlson (1982) and others, that contexts are structured
by a “question under discussion” (QUD) for which discussants
try to provide adequate answers8. The QUD might have been
explicitly asked, but it can also be merely implicit; in some
cases, it may be very general, including the “Big Question,”
7Fricker offers two more specific reasons. First, a secondary message will be too
ambiguous for the speaker to fully commit to it. Second, the audience will have
to choose to draw certain inferences and it is thus they, not the speaker, who are
responsible for the inferences that they choose to draw.
8Schaffer (2008, pp.3–5) offers a very clear, short presentation of the idea.
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what is the way things are? Schoubye and Stokke convincingly
argue that, taking this into consideration, in many ordinary
contexts moderate contextualists are able to provide sufficiently
well-determined (i.e., leaving aside the vagueness and lack of
specificity in fact existing in ordinary communication) contents
literally and directly expressed, completions of the typically non-
truth-conditional, compositionally determined meaning of the
uttered sentence.
Bergmann (1982) had in fact already made a similar point in
defense of metaphorical assertions, which also gives a compelling
reply to Fricker (2012) and Lepore and Stone (2010). As she puts
it (ibid., 231): “without knowing the context in which a metaphor
occurs and who its author is, it is impossible to state conclusively
what the metaphor “means” without drawing out all that it could
mean . . . But bring in a well-defined context and a real author,
and matters may change drastically.” She (ibid.) illustrates this
with the following example:
Suppose I say to you, after hearing the latest report on Three
Mile Island, “As far as I’m concerned, nuclear reactors are time
bombs.” You correctly interpret my remark as an assertion to
the effect that nuclear reactors are likely to fail, at any moment-
of course, with disastrous consequences. A while later you say,
“That was an interesting metaphor: nuclear reactors being time
bombs. Although I don’t think that the guys responsible for those
things want people to get killed by them, still it seems that, like
people who use time bombs, they have a frightening disregard for
human lives.” This, then, is something else that I could have used
the metaphor to assert. But it does not follow, from the possibility
of using a metaphor to make different assertions, that anyone who
does use that metaphor is making all of those assertions.
Bergmann’s point can be articulated by means of Schoubye and
Stokke’s strategy, by taking the specific feature of context required
to develop her argument to be a particular QUD. Thus, we can
take the QUD implicitly assumed in her example to be something
like this: Which consequences should we derive from the Three
Mile Island (28/3/1979) accident?
Using current formal semantics frameworks to model
questions, Roberts (2012) provides a particular theoretical
representation of QUD, which Schoubye and Stokke invoke to
develop their point in a sufficiently precise way. I will not go
into those details here. It is however clear how these to my
mind very plausible views help illustrating the main claim I
want to make here. QUDs interact with Stalnakerian contexts
in the sort of rule-governed way Lewis (1979) set out to model
with his scorekeeping analogy; but they are not such contexts,
for they are not propositions. So, to adopt proposals of the
sort just outlined requires us to abandon the simple-minded
way of thinking of context presented at the outset. We should
think of them as more complex, structured into at least two
different components endowed with illocutionary features: a class
of propositions that should be mutually known, and a class of
questions (also commonly known as such in felicitous cases) for
which discussants aim in a coordinated way to provide answers9.
9Once again, I refer the reader to Green (2000, pp. 467–470) for a perspicuous way
of formally representing the complexity I suggest we should take contexts to have,
here and below.
EXAMPLE 2: DIRECTIVES
As I said above, it is relatively uncontroversial that, while
questions make contributions to context, their contributions
differ from those that declaratives make. The previous section
showed that this has more encompassing consequences than
generally acknowledged, in that all contexts should be thought
of structured by including a QUD, which then is highly
relevant to determine the addition to the Stalnakerian context
of commonly accepted propositions by ordinary utterances of
declarative sentences. Contexts thus include the Stalnakerian
set of propositions to which speakers are committed in the
way they are committed to their beliefs, updated by accepted
assertions; but they include also a separate class of propositions
to which speakers are committed in the way they are to the
questions that direct their inquiry (in whatever way this is
formally represented), updated by new questions and by the
assertions that partially answer them. Both components are
mutually known, in felicitous cases. Now, as Lewis (1969)
suggested, questions can be taken as a particular kind of
directive (what utterances of imperative sentences signify
by default); and directives in general independently help to
establish the general point we are making here. I will also
use the discussion of this second, less controversial case, to
confront the “flattening” strategy which opponents of the
main claim I will be making tend to use to sustain their
view.
Let us say first a few things about how directives should be
understood in the normative framework I sketched in the second
section. Alston (2000, pp. 97–103) characterizes the constitutive
norm for strong directives such as orders or commands as an
obligation on the addressee to carry them out, emanating from
a relevant authority on the side of the speaker. Kissine (2013, ch.
4) provides a related account of directives as supplying the hearer
with a (mutually manifest) reason to act. In the Williamsonian
format of (KR), the constitutive condition for the specific case of
ordering that these authors advance could be put like this:
(D) One must [(order A to p) only if one lays down on A as a
result an obligation to p].
As in the case of the assertion norms, the obligations here
in question are sui generis and prima facie. As in that case
too, the combinations that the rules forbid (there, to assert
what is not the case, or not known, etc.) should be possible: it
should be possible to command p to A without A’s acquiring
thereby the relevant sui generis prima facie obligation to p. This
requirement ismet: even in the army there are specified situations
under which certain orders (to perform unconstitutional acts, to
violate human rights, etc.), although they come into existence as
emanating from the requisite authority, are nonetheless incorrect
in that the addressees do not thereby incur the intended prima
facie obligation.
Several authors have advanced semantic accounts of directives
on which these are semantically distinctive objects, distinct
from assertions (what declarative sentences signify by default),
just as questions (what interrogative sentences signify by
default) are; Han (2011), Portner (forthcoming), and Jary and
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Kissine (2014) provide good overviews. Along the lines of
Stalnaker (1978), researchers such as Han, Portner and Jary
and Kissine suggest that strong directives also have a content
to be added (when successful) to a collection of propositions.
However, these are not those constituting the Stalnakerian
common ground, but rather a “To Do List” or “Plan Set”
representing something like the active projects of the addressee.
This is consistent with (D); in fact, it is nicely explained
by it.
Like their declarative counterparts, imperative sentences have
uses that go beyond the core cases of strong directives. Uttering
“take bus 44” in reply to “how do I get from here to the
airport?” is not a command, but a suggestion, a piece of advice
or proposal; similarly for an utterance of “come round to my
house to watch the game!,” after the addressee has manifested
interest in watching the game tonight and a lack of any plans
for seeing it. “Help me!” is not a command, but a request.
“Come in!” uttered after someone knocks on my door issues
an authorization. “Get well soon!” said to someone who is ill
or “Please don’t rain!” looking at the sky are expressions of
wishes, rather than orders. Semanticists adopt different views
in light of this. Han focuses on commands as core cases, and
leaves the other cases to be explained pragmatically as indirect
speech acts. Portner and Jary and Kissine aim instead to provide
an account general enough to encompass at least some other
uses.
For our purposes, we do not need to go into these debates. We
have said enough to indicate how directives add to the cumulative
point we are making. Contexts are structured in complex ways,
including different classes of propositions to which speakers are
committed in different modes: in the way we are committed
to our beliefs, but also in the way we are committed to our
intentions, and to the questions guiding our inquiries. And,
as we pointed out above, in felicitous contexts it is all these
different commitments that are matters of mutual knowledge. As
Stalnaker’s (1978) account of assertion emphasizes, an accepted
assertion comes to be presupposed afterwards, allowing for the
satisfaction of presuppositional requirements later on in the
discourse. Similarly, an accepted directive is taken for granted
afterwards, constraining the legitimate moves that can be made
in the discourse game, and obviously the same applies to
the QUD.
Davidson (1979) and Lewis (1970) suggest dealing with non-
declaratives by taking them to be synonymous with explicit
performatives, and then taking the latter to have, from a
semantic standpoint, the truth-conditions they appear to do
compositionally. Thus, “take bus 44!” would just mean, from a
semantic point of view, the proposition that the speaker thereby
requests the audience to take bus 44. Cannot we just adopt this
line and avoid having to ascribe to contexts the complex structure
we have so far posited? By taking questions and directives to
express the propositions self-ascribing speech-acts that these
views envisage, we could just stick to the Stalnakerian view of
context as a set of propositions. It will be convenient to have a
label for this strategy, for we will encounter other versions of it
later in our discussion. Let me refer to it as the flattening scheme,
or simply flattening.
In previous work (García-Carpintero, 2004) I have argued that
these views are unmotivated10. However, even if we accept them
(perhaps invoking the sort of methodological rhetoric discussed
at the end of the first section, which is not far away from
Lewis’s, 1970 own motivation), it is important to appreciate that
such flattening will not ultimately prevent the need for extra
complexity that I am advocating. Let me argue for this here,
before we move to the next example where the same point may
not be equally clear.
In the first place, flattening is unmotivated because the
distinction between the three moods, declarative, interrogative
and imperative, appears to be as semantically relevant as
any syntactic distinctions can be. It is even productive and
systematically reflected in English and other languages in
corresponding distinctions in ascriptions of the types of acts
they indicate: “I told Peter that it is raining,” “I asked Peter
whether it is raining,” “I told Peter to stop the rain.” But let us
grant that at a certain “core semantic” level we might disregard
this, moving the distinctions to pragmatics. I have already
mentioned above the debates betweenminimalists, moderate and
radical contextualists, involving the proper account of examples
such as “I am ready,” “I am tall,” “I have had breakfast,” or
“there is milk in the fridge,” and have expressed my sympathies
for the moderate camp (cf. García-Carpintero, 2006, 2013a).
The point that makes the effect of flattening irrelevant is
that, unless radicals are right, we should distinguish two kinds
of pragmatic intervention. There are the processes producing
clearly secondary, derivative meanings, such as particularized
conversational implicatures and indirect speech acts. And there
are the processes that contribute to determine what intuitively
are the literal, directly conveyedmeanings of ordinary utterances,
as in the examples above—Bach’s (1994) implicitures. Even if
pragmatic processes are involved here, the data make it clear that
they operate at a subsentential level, contributing together with
the semantic compositional core to meanings that are productive
and systematically determined.
So we should acknowledge three different levels of meanings,
to account for which we need specific theoretical tools, reflecting
three distinct robust kinds of fact. There is the core semantic,
compositionally-driven level, at which the temporal contents of
“I have had lunch” and “I have had measles” do not differ. Then
there is the secondary pragmatic level, at which an utterance
of the former sentence conveys a rejection of an invitation to
go to a restaurant. And then there is the intermediary level of
the intuitive literal and direct meaning, at which the temporal
contents of the claims made by the two sentences differ—the
former indicating a shorter interval between the activity and the
current time. Even if pragmatic processes are involved at this
intermediary level, we still need an account of it, and one that
adequately interacts with the core semantic level.
As I understand views like the ones of Lewis and Davidson
I am discussing, they contend that “semantics proper” (the
theoretical pursuit dealing with the first level) should not care
10Davidsonians would do much better to adopt the “success semantics” that
Ludwig (1997) and Lepore and Ludwig (2007, ch. 12) advance; when deployed in
the Stalnakerian framework we are assuming, this would mean accepting the main
claims I am making.
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about the distinction between declaratives, interrogatives and
imperatives, by invoking the flattening strategy. As I said, I do not
believe this is correct. The taxonomical proposals in the debates
about the semantics/pragmatics distinction I have sketched are
not merely terminological arbitrary options: they have theoretical
consequences. In particular, they should allow us to explain
how the meanings at the intermediary level are determined,
productively and systematically so, given the alleged outputs of
the semantic core. It is clear that at the intermediary level a
sentence in the interrogative does not mean the assertion that the
speaker is asking for the relevant content, and the corresponding
point applies to imperatives: they mean, respectively, a question
and a directive. I believe that flattening would make it difficult to
explain how the intuitively literal, direct meaning is conveyed11.
But never mind. The important point is that the intermediary
level—whether purely semantic or pragmatically intruded—is
real;12 it systematically interacts with the core compositional
determination of meaning, and we are entitled to theorize about
it. Once inside it, there is no way of avoiding the complex
structured contexts we have shown the need to envisage.
EXAMPLE 3: PEJORATIVES AND SLURS
As announced, this is the core section of the paper; here I use the
case of slurs and pejoratives to defend my main claim about the
nature of contexts. Kaplan (ms13 ) started a fruitful debate on the
meaning of pejoratives—as in “that bastard Kresge is famous”—
including slurs and racial epithets as in “there are too many
chinks in our neighborhood.” Kaplan suggests that a different
dimension of expressive meaning (“use-conditional,” as opposed
to truth-conditional) is required. Hom (2008) makes a case for
a straightforward truth-conditional account; thus, for instance,
according to him “chink” makes a truth-conditional contribution
akin to that of other predicates such as “Chinese”—a property
determining according to him a necessarily empty extension,
which can be roughly expressed as: ought to be subject to higher
college admissions standards, and ought to be subject to exclusion
from advancement to managerial positions, and . . . , because of
being slanty-eyed, and devious, and good-at-laundering, and . . . ,
all because of being Chinese (Hom, 2008, p. 431). As many have
pointed out (cf. Jeshion, 2013a, pp. 316–319), a main difficulty
for this view lies in the projection behavior of these terms:
when sentences such as those mentioned above are negated, are
antecedents of conditionals, or embedded under modal operators
or in interrogative or directive mood, they still derogate the
relevant targets.
To account for this, writers have argued that the expressive
meaning of pejoratives and slurs is instead either a conventional
11I have defended that explicit performatives such as “I hereby promise not to drink
again” literally say that the speaker promises by that very act not to drink again,
and only indirectly convey the promise, as a form of generalized indirect speech
act (García-Carpintero, 2013b). However, the account there presupposes that the
three moods semantically encode information about speech-act types.
12I do not mean to suggest that the intermediate level is real in the straightforward
psychological sense that many contextualists commit themselves to; cf. García-
Carpintero (2001, 2006). However, as a reviewer helpfully suggested, it is at least
real in that speakers are rationally committed to its deliverances.
13Kaplan, D. (ms) “The Meaning of ‘Ouch’ and ‘Oops.”’
implicature (Potts, 2007) or a presupposition (Macià, 2002, 2014;
Schlenker, 2007)14. In defense of his truth-conditional account,
Hom (2012, pp. 398–401) appeals to generalized conversational
implicatures to explain the projection data. Now, I think a
presuppositional account is more adequate; however, in order to
deflate a very serious objection that has been raised against it, it
is essential that we understand it relative to an extension of the
proposal on the complexity of contents that I ammaking here. In
any case, the other two proposals, the conventional implicature
account and even perhaps Hom’s generalized conversational
implicature view, would also need to assume the extra complexity
in contexts I will show we need. This is what I’ll try to show in
what remains of this section.
Both conventional implicatures (that somehow being poor
contrasts with being honest, for “but” in “he is poor but honest”;
that John is married, for the non-restrictive wh-clause in “John,
who is married, will come to the party”) and presuppositions
(that someone broke the computer, for the cleft-construction in
“it was John who broke the computer”) are semantic, in that
they are conventionally associated with some lexical items or
constructions, and grasping them is required for full competent
understanding15. Both are ways of conventionally indicating
“non-at-issue” content. This is the most general reason why they
project: thus, for instance, the negation in both “he is not poor but
honest” and “it was not John who broke the computer” negates
the “at issue” content, and so the same conventional implicature
and presupposition as before are expressed. Neither can therefore
be rejected by straightforward denials, so speakers must resort to
oblique means such as Saddock’s “hey, wait a minute” objection
(Potts, 2012, pp. 2521–2522; Camp, 2013, pp. 341–342). Thus, it
is not easy to tell them apart. Some researchers appeal to subtle
projection differences (Potts, 2005; Tonhauser et al., 2013), but
there is no agreement on this among linguists. In particular,
their behavior when they occur in ascriptions of beliefs or acts
of saying does not clearly distinguish between them, because,
on the one hand, conventional implicatures might not project
in such cases (Bach, 1999, pp. 338–343)16 , as presuppositions
typically do; and, on the other, presuppositions also project in
14Williamson (2009) argues for a similar view. He classifies the expressive contents
he proposes as conventional implicatures, but he understands that category in a
traditional way, wider than the one I assume following Potts’s work (ibid., 151,
153). I take his view to be compatible with the presuppositional account as much as
with Potts’s view. All these proposals can be viewer as different ways to elaborate on
Kaplan’s view that pejoratives should be account for by adding a “use-conditional”
layer of meaning.
15In the case of presuppositions, Stalnaker and other writers dispute this; García-
Carpintero (2015) defends it, for constructions such as the one given here for
illustration.
16As I have pointed out elsewhere (García-Carpintero, 2006, pp.45–47), Bach
(1999) in fact does not show that conventional implicatures (or presuppositions,
for that matter), as understood here following Potts, are a “myth.” He only shows
that they are not part of “what is said” in his “illocutionary” sense, which is just
to say that they are not part of the “at issue” content of declaratives. Rather they
are, according to him, part of “what is said” in his “locutionary” sense. But this
just means that they are conventional, semantic in the sense that they need to be
grasped for full competent understanding. This is part of current standard views
on conventional implicatures, such as Potts’s. Hom (2008, pp. 424–426; 2012, pp.
391–392) appears to have been misled by Bach’s suggestions in his criticisms of the
conventional implicature view.
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some such cases, like conventional implicatures (Schlenker, 2007,
p. 244)17.
Presuppositions and conventional implicatures have different
natures (Potts, 2007, 2012). Conventional implicatures have
the job of providing new information, exactly like assertions,
except that it is information which (even if relevant) has
a somehow background character. Felicitous presuppositions
articulate (for some relevant purpose) part of what is already
commonly known. Unfortunately, this again does not offer
a straightforward distinction, because, as we already pointed
out above with the “my wife” example, the fact that a
sentence carries a presupposition can be exploited by speakers
to provide uncontroversial background information, through
accommodation. Nonetheless, I am convinced by the arguments
by Macià and Schlenker that the data of projection and rejection,
given clear-headed assumptions about the respective nature of
the two phenomena, show that the best way of classifying the
expressive meanings of pejoratives and slurs counts them as
presuppositions.
However, probably guided by the simple-minded assumptions
about context that I am questioning here, both Macià and
Schlenker give an inadequate characterization of the expressive
presuppositions of pejoratives, which opens the view to spurious
criticism. Schlenker (2007, p. 238) offers this characterization for
the slur “honky”: the agent of the context believes in the world of
the context that white people are despicable. This is a clear-cut
condition on a Stalnakerian context. But, as Williamson points
out (2009, pp. 151–152), it cannot be right, because it does not
capture the normative status of slurs. Exposed to utterances in the
above examples, we would challenge the speaker (using perhaps
some variation of the “hey, wait a minute” strategy) to retract the
derogation of Kresge or Chinese people; but we would hardly
challenge her to retract the suggestion that she believes that
Kresge or Chinese people are despicable: for all we care, shemight
well believe it, but this is not what we need to dissociate ourselves
from when our interlocutors utter slurs we find objectionable. As
Camp (2013, p. 333) points out, Potts’s conventional implicature
account has the same problem, for he just posits a condition on
the subjective emotional state of the speaker—something to the
effect that s/he actually is in a heightened emotional state (Potts,
2007, p. 171; 2012, p. 2532)18.
17Ascriptions of propositional attitudes and speech acts are notoriously context-
dependent; this explains the existential quantifications. In his interesting
discussion of hybrid theories of evaluative terms, modeled on the views on
pejoratives I am discussing, Schroeder (2009, 2014) places a strong emphasis on
a distinction between hybrid expressions whose expressive content project even
in attitude ascriptions, and those that do not. But, as far as I can tell, these are
not properties of expressions themselves: we can only trace tendencies here. Slurs
tend to project in ascriptions, but, as the examples by Schlenker and others show,
they do not always do so. Such tendencies are orthogonal to the conventional
implicature/presupposition divide. Quoting Bach (1999) (a work that he, unlike
Hom–see previous fn.—appraises properly, cf. op. cit., 287-8, fn. 19), Schroeder
shows that “but” might well not project in some ascriptions; but, following Potts
(2005), I am taking non-restrictive wh-clauses as paradigm cases of conventional
implicatures, and they do typically project in attitude ascriptions: John said that
Peter, who will be coming soon, is welcome to the party.
18Boisvert (2014) provides a hybrid account of pejoratives and evaluative terms
in the framework of “success” semantics, along the lines of the modified
Davidsonian proposals in Ludwig (1997) and Lepore and Ludwig (2007, ch. 12).
How, then, should contexts be understood as properly
capturing expressive meanings? This depends on what emotions,
and the speech acts conveying them, are. What pejoratives and
slurs express, in my view, is that a certain emotional state (which,
as researchers on these issues have made clear, can contextually
vary along different parameters, cf. Potts, 2007; Hom, 2008;
Camp, 2013, among others) is fitting or appropriate. Some
philosophers have argued that emotions are just a particular
kind of judgment—one to the effect that an object or situation
instantiates their “formal objects,” say, that Kresge or Chinese
people are worthy of contempt, in our examples (cf. de Sousa,
2014; Todd, 2014, and references there). If this is right, then
we do not need to go beyond the Stalnakerian context, on
the assumption (which I am making) that presuppositions are
ancillary speech acts, with normative essences like others, whose
specific norm individuates them as requiring their contents
to be common knowledge. That a speaker of “there are too
many chinks in our neighborhood” takes it to be common
knowledge that Chinese people are worthy of contempt explains
the appropriate reaction to the utterance by non-prejudiced
participants in the same conversation. Williamson (2009) seems
to assume something like this19.
This would be a way of dealing with pejoratives analogous to
the one offered by the flattening strategy for non-declaratives.
Like that suggestion, however, the view of emotions and their
expression on which it relies is controversial, and is rejected by
many researchers (D’Arms and Jacobson, 2000, p.67; Deonna
and Teroni, 2014, pp. 18–21). If emotions are instead, as I
believe, sui generis normative states (Mulligan, 1998; D’Arms
and Jacobson, 2000; Deonna and Teroni, 2014), and their
expressions speech acts defined by distinctive norms, then in
order to properly incorporate the presuppositional view we
should add further illocutionary structure to the context set,
and thus encompass them. This additional structure will be
constituted by the intentional objects of the emotional states
(say, Chinese people, with their (alleged) condition of generically
having such-and-such features in the case of “chink”), subject
to the normative condition that such intentional targets are
thereby worthy of contempt and hence adequate recipients
of mistreatment. On this view, the “formal object” of the
emotion—the property of being contemptible in this case–
is not part of the represented content, but the normative
As I said before, this is better than flattening, and also (as a result) compatible
with the main claims I am making here. However, like Schlenker and Potts,
Boisvert assumes a psychological expressivist, non-normative account of the non-
declarative additional speech acts that his account posits, which make it in my
view similarly inadequate. To illustrate: there clearly is a semantic tension between
uttering “thank you for p!” together with “shame on you for p!,” but this cannot be
adequately captured by an account on which the sentences merely indicate that the
utterer actually feels grateful and disappointed regarding p; for, of course, there is
no inconsistency in having such feelings regarding the same situation (cp. Boisvert,
2014, p. 34). In contrast, an account on which the sentences indicate acts subject to
norms such that for them to be correct the same situation is to be both worthy of
gratitude and of indignation does capture the tension.
19Likewise, Macià (2014) poses as the expressive presupposition of “chink” that
speakers in the context are willing to treat Chinese people with a certain kind of
contempt , on account of being Chinese. This is better than Schlenker’s and Potts’
subjectivist proposals, but is still objectionable along the lines that I develop in the
main text.
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condition that allegedly justifies addressing the emotional
attitude toward it.
On the suggested view of emotions and the speech acts
expressing them, the additional “emotive” structure of contexts
should be assumed not only on a presuppositional account of
pejoratives, but also on one on which they are conventional
implicatures. For, even if the expressive content of pejoratives
is background but novel “information,” if unchallenged it would
become part of the context set, licensing presuppositions down
the line. The fact that we need to dissociate ourselves from such a
prospect explains our normative reaction to utterances including
slurs we disapprove of. This is why, even if Potts (2007, 2012)
is right that such contents are conventional implicatures, as I
mentioned above his subjective characterization of the expressive
implicatures should be revised to support the present view of
contexts.
Presuppositions are “filtered” in some contexts: they do
not project when their triggers occur in the consequent of a
conditional whose antecedent states them, or in the second
conjunct of a conjunction whose first conjunct states them: if
someone broke the computer, it was John who broke it; someone
broke the computer, and it was John who did it. Schroeder (2014,
p. 176) uses this point to dismiss the view that the expressive
contents we are considering are presuppositions: “I cannot see
how to construct a sentence of the form “if P, then Mark is a
cheesehead” that does not implicate the speaker in disdain for
people from Wisconsin.” This is well taken, but I take it to
be only a consequence of the fact that the expressive contents
we are discussing—be they presuppositions, or conventional
implicatures—are not just forceless propositions, which is what
antecedents of conditionals or conjuncts must be. This leaves
open whether they are presented as requirements on the common
ground (and hence have a presuppositional character), or as
new background commitments (and hence are conventional
implicatures). Schroeder’s argument is one more example of the
misleading consequences of ignoring the main claim about the
nature of contexts I am making here20.
Some of Hom’s (2010, pp. 176–179; 2012, pp. 390–391)
criticisms of the presuppositional and conventional implicature
view have already been discussed, or have received adequate
replies in the literature. The data about projection and
“cancelation” are less clear than he assumes, and in any case can
be accounted for by both proposals (cf. Macià, 2014). Intuitions
about the truth-values of utterances are much less clear-cut than
he and others take them to be (cf. Jeshion, 2013a, 317), and
again can be accounted for by both the presuppositional and
the conventional implicature proposals. Hom mentions “non-
orthodox” cases that lack derogatory implications; but, again,
defenders of alternative views have shown them to have enough
resources to deal with them, as pragmatic effects or cases of
polysemy (Jeshion, 2013b, pp. 326–330). Last but not least, what
Hom (2010, p. 177) thinks is the “more fundamental problem
20It is a particularly revealing one, because it occurs in a paper that is otherwise
admirably clear about the distinction between contents and forces; Schroeder’s
(2014, pp. 278–280) toy formal model is as clear as Green’s (2000) when it comes to
the proper articulation of meanings that, like expressive contents in my view, are
propositions-cum-illocutionary forces.
with the presupposition account” can be adequately resisted if
contexts are assumed to have the sort of illocutionary complexity
I am arguing for. This is how he summarizes it:
To focus on slurring as a means of efficiently entering information
into the conversational record is to miss the fundamental point of
slurs, namely, that they are typically used to verbally abuse their
targets, with no regard to whether the negative content actually
gets accommodated within a framework of rational, cooperative
behavior.
He (ibid.) summarizes this by approvingly quoting Richard
(2008, p. 21): rather than trying to enter something into the
conversational record, “someone who is using these words is
insulting and being hostile to their targets.” Now, the reply that
the present proposal allows should be obvious. The contrast that
Hom and Richard presume between making a requirement on
the conversational record (or making an attempt at smuggling
it there) and insulting/being hostile to some target does not
exist, when what is thereby assumed to be in the context
is a represented target presented as fitting the normative
condition that it is contemptible and thereby liable to receive
mistreatment: for this is precisely what the insult and the hostility
amount to. It should be granted that Hom’s and Richard’s
presumption that presuppositions merely concern “information”
in the conversational record is shared by most of the theorists
they oppose, but it is nonetheless wrong.
Actually, it is not at all obvious how Hom’s own view
properly captures the insulting character of utterances including
slurs. His proposal is a form of the by now familiar flattening
strategy for rejecting the main point of this paper in favor
of straightforward truth-conditional treatments, the Davidson-
Lewis line for non-declaratives, or the view that emotions
are ordinary judgments, and their expression corresponding
assertions. As we said, an immediate concern this raises has to
do with the “projective” behavior of all such expressions under
negation, conditionalization, etc.: as we have seen, intuitively
expressive contents “escape” the operators under which they
are embedded in such cases, while, if the expressive content is
just straightforward truth-conditional content, it should remain
embedded. But in fact, the problem already affects simple positive
sentences: in principle, an assertion that a command is given
can occur without the command being given; and an assertion
that an emotional state, or the occasion for it, obtains (that
something is frightening or contemptible) can equally occur
without the emotional state obtaining (without the fear or
contempt occurring)21.
As indicated above, Hom (2012, pp. 398–401) purports
to explain the generation of the expressive content (in
embedded and simple constructions) as a Gricean generalized
21The same can intuitively obtain in the opposite direction: the non-cognitive
attitude/act (the command or the derogation) can occur, without the cognitive one
(the belief/assertion that the command or the derogation takes place) taking place,
because the thinker/speaker lacks the conceptual resources to describe the non-
cognitive state/act. Hom deals with this apparent lack of necessity of his account
by appealing to semantic externalism: semantically the equivalence obtains, even if
ordinary speakers lack the resources to appreciate it.
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conversational implicature22. I have serious doubts that this
proposal can work on its own terms, but this need not
concern us here. I want to make a point about it related
to the one I made at the end of the previous section.
In some cases, generalized conversational implicatures are
not projected, but rather generated “locally,” i.e., interacting
with the compositional determination of contents, exactly as
“implicitures”/“explicitures” are. The data suggest that, in some
cases, expressive contents are thus generated locally (Schlenker,
2007, p. 244). It remains to be investigated whether these should
be truly handled locally by our best theories; but, if they are,
a full theoretical account of the data will need to contemplate
the structurally enriched contexts we have advanced, even if
metaphysically/metasemantically we classify the generation of
expressive contents as a generalized conversational implicature.
EXAMPLE 4: PREDICATES OF TASTE
The final two examples will be more cursorily discussed,
but I hope they still have the power of contributing to the
cumulative point I am making. In previous work with Teresa
Marques (Marques and García-Carpintero, 2014), I defended
a contextualist account of predicates such as “tasty” against
criticisms that such a view cannot account for disagreement. In
that paper we replied to proponents of recent forms of relativism,
although the contextualist view that we defend is also relativist in
traditional terms.
In ordinary cases of apparent disagreement between speakers
who assert, respectively, S and not-S, the impression dissolves
after recognition that S includes context-dependent expressions
and that the utterances are made in different contexts. We agree,
however, that an impression of disagreement remains among
subjects who assent to “this is tasty” and its negation, even when
it is clear that they make these judgments relative to different
standards of taste. The main claim we make to account for this is
that the remaining disagreement is practical. It concerns a non-
cognitive pro-attitude that people making this sort of claim (also
in thought) have, favoring shared standards, which we take to be
presupposed. We take this to be a pragmatic form of a “hybrid”
view of a specific set of “thick” terms23.
Väyrynen (2013, ch. 3–6) defends a noncommittal pragmatic
view of the evaluations associated with thick concepts based
on interesting data about “objectionable” concepts, on which
such implications are pragmatic but are neither conventional nor
conversational implicatures nor presuppositions. Objectionable
thick terms are those associated with evaluations found not
acceptable (such as “lewd” or “blasphemous” for many today).
Väyrynen provides interesting data showing that such evaluations
22The semantic externalism to which Hom appeals in order to deal with the
necessity problem (see previous fn.) puts a strain on his appeal to conversational
implicature to deal with this sufficiency one, because implicatures are supposed
to be derivable. It is difficult to understand how ordinary speakers intuiting the
allegedly implicatured condition—in our cases, the derogation of Chinese people,
which is what everybody perceives in utterances of “there are too many Chinks in
our neighborhood”—canmake the inferences, if they themselves lack the resources
to articulate the content of Hom’s truth-conditional analysis.
23Cf. Väyrynen (2013) and Schroeder (2014) for discussion.
project under different embeddings, and also that they can be
(somehow) “canceled.” As the reader will guess, however, I am
not convinced by his arguments that the evaluations do not have a
presuppositional status. Although he does not specifically discuss
them, one of his arguments, the “appropriateness problem,”
would also affect the sort of non-cognitive presuppositions we
posit for terms like “tasty.” He argues (op. cit., 113) that someone
approving the evaluation associated with “lewd” can sensibly
use it while talking to commonly known objectors to such
evaluations. Something similar might obtain in a case in which
two food critics disagree about the food served at a restaurant,
knowing full well that they do not share standards and that
neither of them is at all disposed to adopt the other’s standards.
However, the same situation might obtain with any ordinary
presupposition, as when someone says in anger, “if the idiot I
am talking to were listening, we would have less trouble.” As
Stalnaker (1978, p. 87) pointed out, presupposing (or asserting
it, for that matter) something that is not accepted and will not
be accommodated might not be pointless, because it might well
have a further point, “as Congress may pass a law knowing it will
be vetoed, a labor negotiator may make a proposal knowing it
will be met by a counterproposal, or a poker player may place a
bet knowing it will cause all the other players to fold24.”
Be this as it may, properly developed, it is essential that the
view is articulated in the sort of framework I am arguing for here,
because according to it what is presupposed is not a proposition,
but a pro-attitude: a preference for shared practical views.
EXAMPLE 5: PRETENSE AND
PRESUPPOSITIONS
In previous work (García-Carpintero, 2013c), I have defended
a specific form of a “pretense-theoretic” account (alternative to
Currie’s, 1990 andWalton’s, 1990) of fiction-makers’ utterances of
sentences such as “When Gregor Samsa woke, he found himself
transformed into a gigantic vermin.” by Kafka in the creation
of Metamorphosis. I defended a speech-act account, assuming
the sort of Austinian view of such acts in terms of social norms
in contrast to Gricean views in terms of psychological reflexive
intentions I advertised above. Onmy proposal, while non-fictions
constitutively result from constatives—acts of saying, the genus
of speech acts characterized in terms of norms requiring truth
for their correctness, of which assertion is the core species—
fictions constitutively result from directives—the genus of which
commands are the core species—characterized by a norm of
providing the intended audience with reasons to imagine the
fiction’s content.
I modeled my proposal on the normative account of directives
derived from Alston’s (2000) outlined above in Section Example
2: Directives. As indicated there, I take commands to be subject
24Väyrynen’s other problem for presuppositional views, the “triggering problem”
(op. cit., 112) does not affect our proposal—which takes the relevant
presupposition to be pragmatic, not lexically triggered. I am not convinced that
it shows that the evaluations he discusses, associated with thick terms, are also
mere pragmatic implications; but it does raise an interesting issue concerning the
triggering of presuppositions—to wit, whether there are general explanations for
some families of triggers (cf. Abrusán, 2011)—which I cannot address here.
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to a norm such that they are correct only if their audiences are
thereby provided with a reason to see to it that their content
obtains. The reason itself is to be based on different sources,
depending on the specific nature of the directive: the authority
of the speaker in the case of commands, or the good will or
presumed interests of the audience in the case of requests,
suggestions, or entreaties. My proposal was that a fiction with the
content p is a result of an act that is correct only if it gives relevant
audiences (audiences of the intended kind, with the desire to
engage with such works) a reason to imagine p. The reasons in
question have to do with whatever makes engaging with good
fictions worthwhile; say, to experience the succession of emotions
provoked by engagement with well-drafted, suspenseful thrillers
for those of us who enjoy these things, or to emotionally engage
the psychological nuances that Henry James’s last novels allow us
to consider in depth.
Now, consider an utterance of “When Gregor Samsa woke,
he found himself transformed into a gigantic vermin.” in its
assumed context. This is a declarative sentence that would be
used by default to make an assertion. The assertion in this case
is merely pretend, which is why we would not complain that it
cannot be true or impart knowledge by its including an empty
name. The speaker, the fiction-maker, is using the sentence to
make a different speech act, a sort of invitation or proposal to
audiences of a certain kind to imagine certain contents. However,
it behaves with respect to the dynamics of discourse exactly like
the corresponding assertion would have done, by legitimizing
presuppositions; thus, the next sentence could have been “it was
not only gigantic, it was also frightening”—a cleft construction
presupposing that the insect was gigantic—and it would feel
entirely felicitous (as opposed to “it was not only tiny . . . ”).
In virtue of examples like this, the common ground
is not taken to consist of propositions that are strictly
speaking common knowledge, but merely commonly “accepted”
(Stalnaker, 2002). But in the framework I am advancing, we
should take such an “acceptance” in the case of fiction to
be a matter of further pretense: accepted pretend assertions
become pretend presuppositions. The presuppositions, like the
initial assertions, occur under the scope of a pretense. A pretend
assertion is one advanced merely for its having taken place
to be imagined, so that it is not subject to ordinary norms
for assertions—only to norms for invitations to imagine. A
pretend presupposition is similarly one put forward merely to be
imagined, hence not subject to norms for presuppositions—one
that does not fail because its content is not common knowledge.
Fully understanding fictional discourse involves additional
pretend presuppositions to the ones created by pretend assertion:
the reference-fixing presuppositions that different views associate
with empty names such as “Gregor Samsa” are similarly merely
pretend presuppositions. It is thus irrelevant that they cannot be
true, nor therefore matters of common knowledge25.
Not all presuppositions that a piece of fictional discourse
assumes are pretend, however. Even the most fanciful tales
assume facts that truly are (taken to be) common knowledge,
25Cf. Sainsbury’s (2010, pp. 143–148) related discussion of “truth under a
presupposition.”
in order to determine their contents. Special among them are
presuppositions constitutive of the meaning of the terms the tale
uses; these cannot be pretend. Reference-fixing presuppositions
associated with names already in use also belong in this category
of non-pretend presuppositions. They interact with merely
pretend presuppositions to determine the content of the fiction,
in ways that have been famously explored by Lewis (1978) in
his influential analysis of “truth in fiction,” by Walton (1990)
for his “principles of generation” and by many others under
their influence. When exposed to a fiction it is very important to
disentangle those presuppositions that are merely pretend from
those that truly taken to be matters of common knowledge; and
there is psychological evidence that the distinction is not lost on
ordinary thinkers26.
We have thus another compelling reason to add structure to
contexts, relative to what is ordinarily assumed: it is mandatory to
distinguish in them propositions to which discourse participants
take themselves to be committed in the way they are to their
beliefs, from those to which they are merely committed in the
“to be imagined” mode.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
In this paper I have assumed a broadly Stalnakerian view of
contexts, the concrete situations relative to which linguistic
exchanges take place; I have assumed, that is, that they are not
just sets of parameters, but meanings shared by the speakers
participating in the relevant linguistic exchange. I have argued
against Stalnaker’s “info-centric” view of such contexts: they
cannot be just propositions, or more in general representational
contents, but rather these contents together with commitments
toward them in different modes by speakers. This should be clear
to everybody, just on the basis of the fact that conversations
involve not just assertoric utterances, but also directives and
questions. With respect to this familiar fact, I have made two
not so familiar points: firstly, that it might well affect all sensible
conversations (because all of them might involve commitments
to share discourse projects); and secondly, that the familiar
“flattening” strategy that attempts to reduce non-declaratives to
declaratives, at least for core semantic purposes, will not make
the contention ineffectual. Then, using the case of the semantics
of pejoratives, I have argued that the consequences of the familiar
fact are many times ignored, at the theorist’s peril: flattening
will not suffice in that case either; and, even among many of
those who do not ignore the fact that such constructions indicate
meanings additional to “at issue” contents, undue fixation on
declaratives and truth-conditional content leads us to ignore the
distinctive normative features of expressive meanings, providing
as a result incorrect accounts. Finally, I have mentioned two
other interesting examples that would allow us to sustain the
same claim: the account of evaluative disagreements, and the
interpretation of fictional discourse.
26Although the psychological data are controversial, having provided some
support to those who want to deny a substantive distinction between fact
and fiction (Matravers, 2014), there is also sufficient evidence supporting the
phenomenological impression that we do separate what we get from fiction and
non-fiction; cf. Friend (2014, forthcoming).
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